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ALMOST THE LAST WORD ON LEGAL SERVICES: CONGRESS 
CAN DO PRETTY MUCH WHAT IT LIKES 
BY JAMES D. LORENZ, JR.* 
For more than thirty years, the federal government has funded legal 
services for the poor.  In its present format, one, and usually only one, legal 
services program is funded in each of some 250 geographical areas established 
by the Legal Services Corporation, the federal government’s funding agent for 
legal services.  During much of this time, the debate over federally-funded 
legal services has focused on the cases legal services attorneys handle.  Certain 
members of Congress find these cases objectionable and Congress ends up 
prohibiting the attorneys from handling them. A lesser-discussed issue arises 
when legal services attorneys decline the taking of certain types of cases or 
clients, sometimes for ideological reasons which are not publicly disclosed. 
Although the preamble to the Legal Services Act of 1974 speaks of providing 
“equal access to the system of justice in our Nation,”1 this is a goal which has 
 
 * The founder and first director of California Rural Legal Assistance, Mr. Lorenz is an 
attorney in private practice, residing in Berkeley, CA. He is also a Book-of-the-Month Club 
author.  During his 24 year legal career, Mr. Lorenz has advised and/or represented large 
corporations, irrigation districts, Pay TV, Cesar Chavez, state college teachers, Edmund G. 
Brown, Jr., the California Employment Development Department, Ralph Nader, various 
environmental organizations, a conservative policy institute, farm workers who support the farm 
workers union, farm workers who oppose the farm workers union, the homeless, and the disabled. 
 1. The full preamble to the Legal Services Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1994), reads as 
follows: 
The Congress finds and declares that — 
(1) there is a need to provide equal access to the system of justice in our nation for 
individuals who seek redress of grievances. 
(2) there is a need to provide high quality legal assistance to those who would be 
otherwise unable to afford adequate legal counsel and to continue the present vital legal 
services program; 
(3) providing legal assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate legal 
counsel will serve best the ends of justice and assist in improving opportunities for low-
income persons consistent with the purposes of this chapter; 
(4) for many of our citizens, the availability of legal services had reaffirmed faith in our 
government of laws; 
(5) to preserve its strength, the legal services program must be kept free from the 
influence of or use by it of political pressures; and 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
296 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:2 
been difficult to achieve, not so much because of limitations in funding, which 
will always be present, but rather because of basic disagreements as to what 
kinds of cases the indigent should have federally-funded “equal access” for. 
While it would be easy to blame this somewhat dysfunctional discourse on 
vulgar materialism, namely on the irreconcilability of persons and groups with 
contrary economic interests, this might not be the right thing to do, as it also 
appears to be the case that there is a fundamental communication problem 
between the legal services program and Congress which, until resolved, will 
insure that the dispute will never be resolved. 
This article attempts to shed more light than heat on the ongoing conflict 
between Congress and the legal services program.  There are seven parts and a 
conclusion. 
Part I states the problem in a nutshell.  There are two components of the 
legal services program, the service component, with which the Congress has 
had no problems, and the impact case (or ideological) component, with which 
Congress has had lots of problems.  Because a separation has never been made 
between the two components when the appropriation for legal services has 
been voted on, the two components have been confused, both legislatively and 
conceptually.  Congress has been left with no choice but to vote them up-or-
down together, which has proved to be something of a Hobson’s Choice. 
Part II begins the more detailed analysis of the legal services program by 
examining the situation where legal services lawyers have taken on cases 
which the Congress doesn’t wish them to handle and Congress then prohibits 
them from handling these types of cases. 
Part III continues the analysis by considering the situation where it is the 
legal services programs themselves which veto the representation of certain 
types of clients or cases, a situation which Congress hasn’t addressed yet. 
Part IV considers the situation which arose in 1996 and afterwards, where 
Congress tried to get the Legal Services Corporation, which funds legal 
services throughout the United States, to adopt competitive bidding and equal 
allocation of funding as part of its funding procedures – and largely failed to 
get the LSC to take meaningful action. 
Part V turns to an examination of the IOLTA programs instituted in 49 
states around the country, where state bar associations pool the interest earned 
from trust accounts set up by lawyers with the monies their clients give them 
and then give the money to local legal services programs to supplement their 
services.  IOLTA programs have proved to be significant for legal services in 
two respects: first, they have largely made up for the cuts which Republicans, 
Congresses and/or Presidents have made in the legal services program; and 
 
(6) attorneys providing legal assistance must have full freedom to protect the best interests 
of their clients in keeping with the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of 
Ethics, and the high standards of the legal profession. 
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second, they have enabled legal services attorneys to fund types of litigation 
which they are forbidden by Congress to undertake with federal monies. 
Part VI asks the question why legal services attorneys have so long held on 
to the hope of doing impact litigation despite continuing congressional 
directives to the contrary. 
And finally, in the Conclusion, the author concludes that after 35 years of 
controversy, a consensus has finally been reached about legal services and 
legal services is here to stay.  The author points out that the dispute has 
essentially been resolved in that legal services has become largely a legal aid 
program except that it is free to raise money from non-governmental services 
to finance impact litigation. But until there is a more formal acknowledgment 
of this, Congress may be unwilling to increase funding for legal services work. 
I. THE PROBLEM IN A NUTSHELL: LEGAL SERVICES HAS A SERVICE 
COMPONENT  AND AN IMPACT COMPONENT BUT BOTH ARE 
FUNDED TOGETHER. 
There are two components to the legal services program, the service 
component, with which Congress has had few problems, and the impact case 
(or ideological) component, with which Congress has had lots of problems. 
The services component of legal services goes back to legal aid, a form of 
charity to the poor which was financed by local bar associations,2 beginning 
with the New York Legal Aid Society, the predecessor of which was 
commenced in 1876 by German-American non-lawyers concerned about 
protecting German immigrants from being preyed upon by “sharps.”3 A 
statement of purposes revealed the narrow objectives of the new organization, 
to wit, “to render legal aid and assistance, gratuitously, to those of German 
birth, who may appear worthy thereof, but who from poverty are unable to 
procure it.”  Out of this statement would come one theme which would 
characterize legal aid for the next seventy-five years, namely help for the 
“worthy poor.” In 1901, at the 25th anniversary dinner of the New York Legal 
Aid Society, . . . Vice-President Theodore Roosevelt described legal aid as a 
necessary bulwark against “chaos” and “violent revolution.”4 Meanwhile in 
Chicago, a second legal aid had been formed, this one to protect young women 
who were lured into seduction under the guise of employment offers.5 
 
 2. The history of legal aid is ably recounted in JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: 
LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN MODERN AMERICA 53-62, 268-269 (Oxford U. Press, 1976). 
 3. “Sharp” is an American slang word from the 19th Century. “One skilled in forms of 
cheating,. . . one who seeks to take, or habitually takes, advantage of others.” HAROLD 
WENTWORTH & STUART B. FLEXNER, DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN SLANG (1960). 
 4. AUERBACH, supra note 2, at 55. 
 5. Id. at 53. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
298 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:2 
The theme of protecting young women against seduction—and even being 
forced into prostitution in Chicago—was a theme which another Theodore, 
Theodore Dreiser, would pick up in his novel Sister Carrie,6 first published in 
1901. 
Poor Sister Carrie. In the novel, she had no Chicago Legal Aid Society to 
protect her. 
By adopting self-imposed restrictions on its activities, legal aid prevented 
it or its clients from becoming controversial. As Jerome Auerbach noted in his 
excellent history of the American legal profession: 
“Not only did legal aid confine its energies to the deserving poor but, 
fearful lest it be accused of competing with the bar, it restricted itself to claims 
so small that no practicing lawyer would consider handling them.”7 
Receiving little or no government funding also helped legal aid avoid 
controversy. 
Jump cut to 1964. The winds of change are blowing. Edgar and Jean Cahn 
wrote an article in the Yale Law Journal announcing a new kind of legal 
services which was being tried out in New Haven, Connecticut, and which, it 
seemed, might become a component of the newly-declared War on Poverty.8 
The title of the Kahn’s memorable article is “The War on Poverty: A Civilian 
Perspective.”9  “President Johnson has declared unconditional war on poverty. 
The strategy of that way appears to have been shaped by an awareness of the 
interrelatedness of the social, economic, legal, educational, and psychological 
problems which beset the poor and by a recognition of the necessity to involve 
all segments of society in a many-pronged attack on these problems.”10 
In their article, the Cahns made no mention of legal aid restricting itself to 
the handling of little cases, which have come to be called “service work;” nor 
was there any mention of “legal aid” as such. The new term was “legal 
services” or, preferably, “neighborhood legal services,” signifying that the 
services were to be brought closer to the people.11 
 
 6. THEODORE DREISER, SISTER CARRIE (1982). 
 7. AUERBACH, supra note 2, at 56. 
 8. Edgar S. Cahn & Jean C. Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE 
L.J. 1317 (1964). 
 9. When one rereads the Cahns’ seminal article thirty years after it was written, one is 
struck by how dated it seems. But how electrifying it was for many at the time, the author 
included. Here is the opening paragraph of the Cahns’ article: 
 10. Id. 
 11. As funding for old-style legal aid was limited, most legal aid societies could afford to 
maintain only one office, which was usually located in a downtown area. With the infusion of 
federal money, on the other hand, legal services programs could afford to be more democratic and 
go to the people. 
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There was also talk of representing poor people’s groups, as if the poor had 
a corporate identity. What could this mean?12 
In 1965, Sargent Shriver, the newly-appointed Field Marshall of the War 
on Poverty and Lyndon Johnson’s selection as the head of the Office of 
Economic Opportunity, decided to create both neighborhood legal services and 
the neighborhood health centers out of whole cloth, as neither program was 
expressly authorized in the War’s enabling legislation, the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964.13 Although at the time it is not clear what Mr. 
Shriver had in mind, within a year after legal services was started, the first two 
grants funded were DNA-People’s Legal Services, Inc., which purported to 
represent a whole Indian tribe, even a nation, (the Navajo nation), and 
California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., which proposed to provide 
representation to a whole social class in California, namely the farm workers 
striking on the side of Cesar Chavez. 
Some neighborhoods! 
As Gary Bellow, now a clinical professor of law at Harvard Law School, 
would observe in 1967, “Neighborhoods, shoot, what this thing is about is 
power.”14 
 
 12. Little did conservatives realize at the time that the Cahns’ article would serve as a 
blueprint for a social change financed by taxpayers’ dollars.  Sprinkled throughout the Cahns’ 
article were some of the concepts and buzzwords of the time, including “maximum feasible 
participation” by the poor themselves, focus on the neighborhood,” “comprehensive plan,” “a war 
to be fought by professionals on behalf of the citizenry through service programs,” and 
administration “on a decentralized basis” but involving the “integration of various disciplines.”  
Cahn & Cahn, supra note 12, at 1318-21.  It would not take conservatives long to realize that they 
wanted no part of this “citizenry” that the war was being fought on behalf of and that these 
government-paid “professionals” were certainly not representing them. 
 13. For a recounting of the early history of OEO-funded neighborhood legal services, see 
EARL JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORM: THE FORMATIVE YEARS OF THE OEO LEGAL SERVICES 
PROGRAM (1974). The beginning of the OEO-funded neighborhood health centers is described in 
PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATIONS OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 370-73 (1982). 
 14. Conversation with the author sometime in 1967. For a time, Mr. Bellow and the author 
worked together in California Rural Legal Assistance. During this period, the author’s 
explanation as to why CRLA should be representing groups as well as individuals was somewhat 
different than Mr. Bellow’s, which was reflective of their different backgrounds, the author 
having worked for a corporate law firm in Los Angeles and Mr. Bellow, for the public defender’s 
office and the community action program in Washington, D.C. In the author’s view, the poor 
deserved to be represented in the group interests just as corporations were, that is by highly 
competent corporate-style law firms like the one the author had worked for. This was also the 
position of Sargent Shriver, another corporate lawyer. When John Sutro, President of the 
California Bar Association in 1966, wired Sargent Shriver to say that the Bar opposed CRLA’s 
initial grant application “because it proposes to take sides in an economic struggle still pending,” 
Mr. Shriver wired back that if Pillsbury, Madison & Sutro, Mr. Sutro’s law firm, would retire 
from the struggle, Mr Shriver would be happy to decline CRLA’s grant application. As Mr. Sutro 
declined to respond to Mr. Shriver’s offer, Mr. Shriver approved CRLA’s grant application in 
May of 1966. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
300 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:2 
And therein laid the seed of the legal services controversy, which hasn’t 
abated to this day. 
When people speak of guaranteeing “equal access to the system of 
justice,”15 do they mean access equal to the kind of representation which the 
ordinary, middle class American citizen can afford—or do they mean access 
equal to that enjoyed by big corporations and government agencies? 
During the debate over legal services which has taken place over the past 
thirty years, critics of the program have generally meant the former, supporters 
of the program, the latter. At the nub of the dispute is the failure to make a 
conceptual distinction between the completion of basic service work, which 
most critics of the program are willing to support with federal money, and the 
completion of impact (or ideological) litigation, which many congresspersons 
are not so willing to support. And the failure to make the distinction—and the 
effort to keep Congress from making it—has been quite intentional on the part 
of some of the program’s supporters in that they realize that if Congress were 
ever to separate out the service component from the impact component and 
vote on each separately, the service component would win by a wide margin 
and the impact component would lose by a wide margin. What has ensued over 
the thirty years, then, has been a purposeful dis-information campaign16  
conducted by some legal services’ supporters which is intended to induce 
Congress to keep the impact work along with the service work, the bath water 
along with the baby. 
Of course, the main fault lies with Congress itself, who does after all have 
the authority to legislate restrictions on the legal services program pursuant to 
Article I of the U.S. Constitution and can choose to interpret the program as it 
sees it. 
II. A MATTER OF PRIORITIES: WHEN LAWYERS FOR THE NEEDY 
HANDLE CASES WHICH CONGRESS DOES NOT WANT THEM TO 
TAKE. 
It all seems simple enough. The supply of free legal services is less than 
the demand for such services, which means that the providers of the services 
 
 15. “Equal access to the system of justice” is the catch phrase which appears in the very first 
part of the Preamble to the Legal Services Act of 1974. See supra note 14. It is also the mantra 
which American Bar Association representatives use when they go up to Capital Hill to plead for 
more appropriations for the legal services program. See Roberta C. Ramo, Let’s Not Take It 
Anymore, Speaking Out Against Spurious Attacks on the Legal System is Vital, 82 A.B.A. J. 6 
(1996). 
 16. “Dis-information” is a word which has come into vogue in the Information Age. It 
means to put out information which, although it may be true in itself, is peripheral to the issue at 
hand and which therefore has the effect of diverting attention from a consideration of the main 
issue. 
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must ration the dispensing of the services in some way or another, which 
requires, in turn, the setting of some sort of priorities. 
But how to do this? And who should do it? 
During the First World War, the French army developed a method of 
distributing limited medical care on the battlefield which they called triage, or 
the taking into account of (a) the seriousness of the injury and (b) the 
likelihood of survival.17 
When it comes to legal services, however, it is not as clear what constitutes 
the “seriousness” of an applicant’s problem.  In fact, for some thirty years the 
federal agencies which have funded legal services have passed the buck on the 
question, leaving it up to their grantees to determine how their own priorities 
will be set.18  The current funder of the legal services program, the Legal 
Services Corporation, requires its grantees to go through a priority-setting 
process but does not tell them what priorities to set.  According to Sec. 1620.3 
of 61 Federal Regulations 45,749, for example: 
(a) The Governing body of a recipient must adopt procedures for 
establishing priorities for the use of all of its Corporation and non-
Corporation resources and must adopt a written statement of 
priorities. . . 
(b) The procedures adopted must include an effective appraisal of the 
needs of eligible clients in the geographic area served by the recipient, 
and their relative importance, based on information received from 
potential or current eligible clients solicited in a manner reasonably 
calculated to obtain the views of all significant segments of the client 
population. 
(c) The following factors should be among those considered by the 
recipient in establishing priorities: 
(1) Suggested priorities promulgated by the Legal Services 
Corporation;. . . 
(2) [An appraisal of]. . . all significant segments of. . . [the client] 
population with special legal problems or special difficulties of 
access to legal services; 
(3) The resources of the recipient; 
(4) The availability of another source of free or low-cost legal 
assistance in a particular category of cases or matters; 
(5) The availability of other sources of training, support, and outreach 
services; 
 
 17. See THE NEW MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 765 (1989). 
 18. The current funder of the legal services program, the Legal Services Corporation, 
requires its grantees to go through a priority-setting process but does not require what shall be the 
priorities.  See 45 C.F.R. § 2996 (1996). 
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(6) The relative importance of particular problems to solution through 
legal processes; 
(7) The susceptibility of particular problems to solution through legal 
processes; 
(8) Whether legal efforts by the recipient will complement other 
efforts to solve particular problems in the area served; 
(9) Whether legal efforts by the recipient will result in efficient and 
economic delivery of legal services; and 
(10) Where there is a need to establish different priorities in different 
parts of the recipient’s service area. 
In other words, legal services programs can pretty much set their priorities 
in any way they like.  Another thing which can be noted about the priorities 
requirement contained in Section 1620.3 is that distinction is blurred between 
service work and impact work; and if anything, the word ‘priority’ creates a 
bias in favor impact work in that handling ‘bigger’ cases can mean more ‘bang 
for the dollar.’  Insofar as the author is aware, the Legal Services Corporation 
has never cut off a grantee’s funding because of a failure to do its priorities 
correctly. 
No doubt the legal services program would have met a quick and 
spectacular end if most of its grantees had behaved like California Rural Legal 
Assistance (CRLA), Ronald Reagan’s least favorite legal services program, 
which in a two-week period during the summer of 1967 halted the importation 
of braceros, or Mexican contract workers, into the California tomato harvest 
and blocked $860 million in cuts which Governor Reagan was proposing to 
make in the state’s Medicaid/Medi-Cal program.19 But fortunately for 
“neighborhood legal services,” as it was then called, most of the programs 
continued to operate in the conventional legal aid manner of doing mostly 
service work on behalf of individual indigents; and most of the programs 
continued to operate in the conventional legal aid manner today. 
As early as 1968, the Congress began restricting the kinds of cases legal 
services programs could handle and has been laying down prohibitions ever 
since. If one wishes to know what the Congress—and the American people—
have been worried about during this almost-30 year period, one can do little 
better than to consult the list of prohibitions which the Congress has laid on 
legal services. 
No involvement in Selective Services had to do with the Vietnam War and 
the large number of young men who were trying to opt out of military service.  
The prohibition against representing persons who were allegedly engaging in 
riots was precipitated by the Watts and Detroit riots.  The prohibition against 
 
 19. The braceros case was never reported as it was settled before it was appealed.  The 
Medi-Cal case is reported as Morris v. Williams, 433 P.2d 697, 67 Cal.2d 733, 63 Cal. Rptr. 689 
(1967). 
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conducting training programs or to organize and demonstrate was caused by 
Cesar Chavez’s California grape strike and efforts at community and labor 
organizing throughout the country.  No providing of legal representation in 
non-therapeutic abortion cases – this was post-Roe v. Wade, of course.  No 
voter registration or transportation of legal services clients to the poll – this 
was to calm Republican fears about the Democrats using the legal services 
program to overwhelm them at the polls.20 
Over and over again, Congress said to the some legal services program, in 
effect, “Just stick to doing legal aid work,” and over and over again, legal 
services were refusing to listen. 
Despite the continual Congressional cutbacks on what legal services could 
do, they continued to receive larger and larger annual appropriations from 
Congress until the first years of the Reagan administration; and legal services 
did not suffer a catastrophic funding loss until  the 1965-1996 Congress under 
Newt Gingrich when $122 million was cut from the legal services program. 
Perhaps the greatest achievement of legal services during the period from 
1965-80 was the creation, in 1974, of a separate funding agency for legal 
services, the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) which had the effect of 
successfully insulating the local programs from hostile political pressure.  The 
support of the American Bar Association has also been crucial.21  In both the 
creation of the LSC and the maintenance of Congressional funding for legal 
services throughout the 30-year history of legal services, the ABA made the 
difference for legal services.  How well the ABA fared financially for legal 
services depended, in turn, on which party was in control of the House, the 
Senate, and the Presidency.  When Democrats were in control of the House, 
the Senate, and the Presidency, as they were from Fiscal Year (FY) 1977 
through 1980 and from FY 1993 through 1995, appropriations for legal 
services climbed substantially, although the Clinton administration was 














$33 million (+) 
$80 million (+) 
$65 million (+) 
 
 20. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996f(b)(10), 2996e(5)(b)(i), 2996fb(6), 2996b(8), and 2996a(6)(B) & 
(C). 
 21. All of the components of the War on Poverty which had gone by the wayside by 1974 
were those which a) did not involve the dispensation of services by professionals and b) did not 
have the lobbying support of professional organizations such as the American Bar Association, 
the American Medical Association, and the National Education Association. Hence, legal 
services, community health services, and Head Start were saved—and community action was 
lost. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 











$30 million (+) 
************ 
$ 7 million (+) 
$43 million (+) 
None 
 
When the White House was held by a Republican such as George Bush, who 
was not hostile to legal services, and one or both houses of Congress were held 
















$ 3 million (+) 
$ 8 million (+) 
$11 million (+) 
$23 million (+) 
 
When, on the other hand, the White House was held by a Republican who 
was hostile to legal services, such as Ronald Reagan,22 the legal services 

























$21 million (+) 
$80 million (-) 
$80 million (-) 
$34 million (+) 
$30 million (+) 
$13 million (-) 
$13 million (+) 
None 
 
During the first and second congressional sessions after the Republicans 
took over the House and Senate, President Clinton was still in office, and the 
Republicans in the House were led by Newt Gingrich, who, like Ronald 
Reagan, was openly hostile to legal services, legal services suffered the 
greatest decrease of all time in its appropriations: 
 
 
 22. Mr. Reagan’s thoughts about California Rural Legal Assistance and legal services are set 
forth in his 1976 campaign biography SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN 46-48 (New York: Berkley 
Books, 1976). 
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$122 million (-) 
$  5 million (+) 
$  0 
$ 17 million (+). 
 
The $122 million decrease which legal services suffered in FY 1996 occurred 
despite the fact that Mr. Clinton, a Democrat, was President and the First Lady, 
Hillary Rodham Clinton, had served as Chairperson of the board of the Legal 
Services Corporation in the late 1970’s.23 
 Along with the Gingrich onslaught on legal services came further 
prohibitions on what legal services attorneys could do, including no 
representing of illegal aliens, no filing of class actions, no challenging of 
federal restrictions on welfare, and no use of LSC money in support of any of 
the above.24  According to legal services people, these restrictions were the 
most crushing of any of the prohibitions they had  suffered in 25 years.  In all 
in 1996, some 19 restrictions were imposed on what legal services lawyers 
could do. 
 In early 1997, legal services programs in different parts of the country filed 
three law suits against LSC arguing that the Congressional bans on the use of 
federal monies for certain purposes constituted a violation of the First 
Amendment rights of both legal services clients and attorneys.25  After LSC 
adopted 45 C.F.R. 1610 (1997) permitting the use of non-federal funds to 
finance Congress-prohibited litigation by entities which were separate and 
independent from LSC grantees, the attacks on the Congressional prohibitions 
were rendered moot.26 
 
 23. The source of the FY 1976-1992 figures is the LEGAL SERVICES CORPORATION 
APPROPRIATIONS HISTORY, as prepared by LSC.  The source of the FY 1993-1998 figures is Ken 
Boehm, Executive Director, National Legal & Policy Center, McLean, VA, who has graciously 
provided the numbers to the author. 
 24. For a description of the damage that Newt wrought, see “Recent Legislation: 
Constitutional Law – Congress Imposes New Restrictions On Use Of Funds By The Legal 
Services Corporation – Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions And Appropriations Act of 1996. Pub. 
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321,” 110 HARV. L. REV. 1346 (1997) [hereinafter Recent 
Legislation]. 
 25. Varshavsky v. Geller, No. 40767/91 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), Dec. 24, 1996, reprinted in N.Y. 
L.J. 2 (1996); Legal Aid Society v. Legal Services Corp., No. 97-00032 (D. Ha. 1997); Velasquez 
v. Legal Services Corp., No. 97-00182 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 26. 45 C.F.R. 1610 (1997).  The date the final rule was effective was June 20, 1997.  Since 
45 C.F.R. 1610 provides a viable way for legal services programs to conduct litigation prohibited 
by Congress, it has been widely followed.  Not only can entities spun off from legal services 
programs use IOLTA monies to do litigation prohibited of LSC grantees, they can also raise 
monies from other private sources, including charitable foundations, to do so. 
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 As Professor Richard Epstein has pointed out in a 1988 Harvard Law 
Review article,27 one consideration to take into account in deciding whether a 
condition imposed on the receipt of federal benefits is constitutional or not is 
whether the recipient is totally barred from engaging in a prohibited activity 
which may be constitutionally protected or whether it is only barred in 
engaging in the activity with federal funds.  Where the latter is this case, as 
was true in the three suits challenging Congress’ 1996 restrictions, in Regan v. 
Taxation with Representation (1983),28 and in Rust v. Sullivan (1991),29 the 
restrictions are more likely to be found constitutional.  In Regan v. Taxation 
with Representation, it might be recalled, the Court held that the section of the 
Internal Revenue Code which prohibits nonprofit organizations from using tax-
exempt contributions to finance lobbying activities does not offend their First 
Amendment rights because they still have the right to do lobbying with non-tax 
exempt monies; and in Rust v. Sullivan, the Court upheld regulations that 
prohibited recipients of federal family planning funds from using such monies 
in programs where abortion was a method of family planning because, as the 
Court noted, a grantee can continue to perform abortions, provide abortion-
relation services, and engage in abortion advocacy with independent funds.  In 
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California (1984),30 by contrast, the 
prohibition at issue was a ban on public television airing editorials no matter 
what the source of funding – and this was struck down. 
 In light of Regan v. Taxation with Representation, Rust v. Sullivan, and 
FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, it would seem that LSC’s 45 
C.F.R. 1610 regulation is valid in that a way for entities separate from LSC 
grantees to expend non-LSC funds on litigation which Congress has prohibited 
LSC grantees from doing with LSC funds. 
In the approximately thirty years in which restrictions have been placed on 
the legal services program, none of Congress’ restrictions have been 
overturned by a court on a permanent basis; and in addition, none of Congress’ 
restrictions have been withdrawn by Congress once they were imposed, even 
though the control of both Houses of Congress and the Presidency have shifted 
from one party to the other and back again. 
 
 27. Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions: State Power, and the Limits of 
Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1988). 
 28. 103 S. Ct. 1997, 76 L.Ed.2d 129 (1983). 
 29. 500 U.S. 173, 114 S. Ct. 1997, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991). 
 30. 468 U.S. 364, 82 L.Ed.2d 278, 104 S.Ct. 3106 (1984). 
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III. THE MATTER OF PRIORITIES CONTINUED: WHEN LAWYERS FOR 
THE NEEDY REFUSE TO TAKE CASES WHICH THE INDIGENT WANT 
THEM TO DO. 
Although this second sort of situation is less common than the instance 
where legal services attorneys are doing types of cases which Congress 
disapproves of and finally prohibits, it does arise and is more common than 
might be supposed. The typical instance arises when an applicant for legal 
services has a legal problem which involves suing someone who the legal 
services program wish not to sue or has a type of problem which the legal 
services program does not think is very important or is not interested in 
handling. 
Are legal services programs within their rights in refusing to handle certain 
types of problems which poor people have on a regular basis and which the 
Congress had not prohibited the programs from handling?  So far LSC’s 
answer has been “yes” and the Congress hasn’t said otherwise.  Although 
Congress has begun to move in the direction of saying what legal services 
programs should do as well as what they shouldn’t do. 
In 1966, shortly after California Rural Legal Assistance was funded by the 
office of Economic Opportunity (OEO), its founder and first director made an 
agreement with Cesar Chavez whereby CRLA agreed not to handle any 
domestic relations cases, so that more attorney time might be freed up to file 
lawsuits against growers which would be of help to the farm worker’s union. 
In return, Cesar agreed to support CRLA. A corollary to the agreement was 
that CRLA would not file any lawsuits against the union.31 
Both policies have remained in effect to this day.  
Because of the sensitivity of the two agreed upon policies, no public 
announcement was made by CRLA about them, nor, over a thirty-year period, 
did CRLA explicitly inform either of the federal agencies which funded it 
about the policies.  Every year, CRLA would submit, first to OEO and then to 
the Legal Services Corporation, its statistical caseload reports, which reported 
that CRLA did less domestic relations work per total caseload than any other 
legal services program in the country—and every year, OEO or LSC would not 
ask any questions. 
Perhaps this was the first instance of President Clinton’s “Don’t ask, Don’t 
tell” rule, who can say. 
It was also the case that when CRLA reported on its priorities, as it was 
required to do by a LSC regulation, it would say what it did do but not what it 
did not do.  Again, LSC would ask no questions. 
Since CRLA is the only federally-funded legal services program in its 
service area, which comprises 19,226 square miles of territory and contains 
 
 31. The author is familiar with CRLA’s policies because as the founder and first director of 
CRLA, he was the one who agreed to them with Cesar Chavez. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
308 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:2 
some 287,164 poor people, many of the indigents residing in the area had no 
alternative way of securing free domestic relations assistance. 
In California, CRLA is the only one of 24 LSC-funded programs providing 
basic legal assistance which has a no-domestic relations policy. During 1995, 
the other 23 legal services programs in California handled more than 90,000 
domestic relations cases, which comprised some 30% of their total caseloads, 
including 28,967 divorce/annulments, 18,465 espousal abuses, 17,431 child 
custody/visitations, and 9,342 child supports.32 
On May 20, 1996, the Board of Directors of the Legal Services 
Corporation declared domestic relations cases the number one priority of the 
legal services program, with particular emphasis on protecting against spousal 
and child abuse. This policy was later incorporated into a federal regulation 
recorded at 61 Fed. Reg. 26,934 (1996).  But despite the resolution and 
regulation, CRLA made no change in its policy. 
Nor did CRLA alter its policy after a lawsuit was filed against it in 
November of 1996 alleging that the policy constituted gender discrimination 
because, in refusing to take domestic violence and paternity cases, it especially 
affected women adversely.33 The most notable aspect of the lawsuit was that it 
was brought by three female farm workers (campesinas) who were also 
members of CRLA’s board of directors, and/or advisory committees. 
The campesina’s grievance was widely reported in the electronic and print 
media, and on December 12, 1996, an article appeared on the editorial page of 
the Wall Street Journal entitled “When Legal Aid’s No Help.”34  “California 
Rural Legal Assistance is one of the oldest, largest and most radical of the 300 
federally funded legal services programs for the poor,” the article began. 
Long under fire of conservative ire, it is now under fire from its own side. Last 
month, the organization was named as a defendant in a suit charging the group 
with systematically refusing to represent women who were victims of domestic 
violence. In the words of the complaint, the message was ‘CRLA to Battered 
Women and Children: Get Lost.’ 
The chief culprit here was allegedly CRLA’s fund-raising and lobbying arm, 
the CRLA Foundation. Several years ago several women farm workers decided 
to create an organization called Lideres Campesinas (Farmworker Women 
Leaders) to promote women’s interests. Seeing dollar signs, the CRLA 
 
 32. The only domestic relations work which CRLA reported itself as doing were brief 
interviews and consultations before its interviewers referred people out the door.  The annual 
caseload statistics referred to, which were for 1995, were graciously provided the author by the 
Legal Services Corporation. 
 33. The case, Campesinas de Cal. v. Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, Inc.,  Monterey County 
Superior Court No. 96-109567, was based on California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act, Civil Code 51, 
which prohibits any private business enterprise from discriminating against various classes of 
people, including women and children. 
 34. Rael Jean Isaac, When Legal Aid’s No Help, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1996, at A12. 
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Foundation offered to raise money, and sent off fund-raising proposals to a 
series of feminist foundations, describing domestic violence as an important 
problem to be addressed. Needless to say, . . . none of the prospective funders 
was informed that neither the foundation nor CRLA would touch domestic 
violence cases. 
Although the money was ostensibly to benefit the new organization, the 
complaint charges that the CRLA Foundation pocketed most of it, using it for 
overhead and to fund a staffer hot on the trail of the ‘root causes’ of the 
women’s problems—which, according to the funding proposal, lay in 
‘institutional discrimination, gender segregation, and class stratification.’ 
When the CRLA did spend money on the women, the group used them as 
weapons in an ideological struggle. Several of the women were packed off to 
the International Women’s Conference in Beijing and to the United Nations in 
New York as exhibits on the oppression of women farm workers in the U.S. 
They also enjoyed a private audience with President Clinton at the White 
House. 
But their involvement in the campesinas project proved costly to the women’s 
domestic life. Several say they were beaten in the course of their participation 
in the project by their husbands, one of them fleeing to another town. 
According to the complaint, a plaintiff, on her return from Beijing, was ‘beaten 
by her husband because she was away from home so much, she wasn’t cooking 
dinner for the family and because she wasn’t bringing any salary home from 
the project the CRLA Foundation had begun ‘for her.’ She too fled from the 
house, sleeping in the back seat of the family car.35 
Certainly in December of 1996, the Legal Services Corporation had in 
place all the regulations it needed to resolve the CRLA problem, including its 
regulation 1602.3 dealing with priorities.36  In addition, to 45 C.F.R. § 1620 
(1996), LSC has adopted a Notice of Suggested Priorities, published in 61 Fed. 
Reg. 26,934 (1996), which puts “Support for Families” at the top of LSC’s 
priorities list and placed special importance on protecting women and children 
against domestic violence. Although the Notice was only a recommendation to 
LSC grantees, it would seem that at the very least it was incumbent on 
applicants/grantees to indicate why they were not following the suggested 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. 45 C.F.R. § 1620 (1996), which was most recently published by LSC on August 29, 
1996, requires LSC grant applicants to go through a priority-setting process with potential clients, 
existing clients, and other groups of persons, such as local bar members, and to notify LSC of the 
priorities they propose to follow—which presumably means the types of cases they aren’t going 
to handle as well as the kinds of cases they are going to do. At the time the announcement of 
priorities is made to LSC, during the grant application process, LSC then has the opportunity to 
accept the application in whole, in part, reject it, and/or attach special conditions to the grant 
which, for example, might require the grantee to take certain types of cases which, in its priority 
statement, the grantee/applicant said it wasn’t going to handle. See 61 Fed. Reg. 45,747 (1996). 
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priority in their own set of recommended priorities, which LSC retains the 
authority to approve or disapprove.  Yet the LSC made no reference to any of 
these regulations, nor did it choose to take any action regarding CRLA except 
to re-fund the program for a 3-year period.37 
As it turns out, CRLA is not alone in using ideological considerations in 
picking and choosing whom and what it will represent.  Until recently, a gay 
and lesbian legal rights group in San Francisco would file lawsuits against 
straights who injured gays or lesbians but not against gays or lesbians who 
allegedly injured other gays or lesbians.38  Certain non-profit civil rights 
groups will file Title VII employment discrimination suits against White-
controlled business or government agencies, but not against entities controlled 
by people of color.39 
In the instances cited above and others that could be mentioned, a 
determination has been made concerning who it is acceptable to provide legal 
representation against and who not.  It is also almost invariably the case that 
the groups making such decisions do not choose to publicize them for fear of 
appearing discriminatory. 
This is partly what the debate over “political correctness” has been about, 
namely whether it’s OK to determine who should be including the provision of 
legal representation “in” and who should be “out” when it comes to 
determining who will get special protections from the government and non-
profit agencies. 
What distinguishes legal services programs which discriminate from other 
advocacy groups which do so is that the legal services organizations are largely 
dependent on the federal government for their funding, enjoy exclusive 
franchises for federal funding in their service areas, and, by statement of 
statute, are supposedly dedicated to the provision of equal access to justice 
among all the needy. 
During the 1980’s, the in-group/out-group problem became so extreme that 
CRLA actually filed lawsuits on behalf of poor women who wanted state-
 
 37. Letter from Alexander D. Forger, President, LSC, to Jose Villarreal, Chairperson, Board 
of Directors, CRLA (Dec. 19, 1996), announcing a 3-year grant to CRLA for $4,375,270/year.  
The 3-year grant period, perhaps coincidentally, would carry CRLA’s funding beyond the 
November, 1998 congressional elections, when, it is possible that there might be a political 
configuration in the House which was more favorable to legal services, particularly the more 
radical programs such as CRLA 
 38. The typical cases the legal rights organization had trouble with was where a gay or 
lesbian couple had a dispute over spousal abuse or child custody/support. To its credit, the 
organization finally agreed to handle such cases. 
 39. This observation is based on the author’s personal experience accumulated while 
litigating civil rights cases in the bay area and other regions of California. 
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subsidized abortions while refusing to represent women who wished to protect 
their children against family abuse once the children were born.40 
Now that Congress has prohibited legal services programs from doing 
numerous types of cases, Congress may now need to look at the other side of 
the ledger and consider what types of cases the Legal Services Corporation has 
an affirmative duty to insure are undertaken by one of its grantees, such as 
domestic relations cases.  That is, unless the LSC determines there is some sort 
of problem here and decides to remedy it before Congress does. 
Probably the best resolution to the CRLA problem would be for LSC to 
fund some other entity to operate in CRLA’s 19,226 square mile service area 
to do domestic relations cases and to require CRLA, as a condition of its grant, 
to expend at least 90% of its LSC grant in the rural areas where CRLA clients 
actually live. 
IV. THE COMPETITIVE BIDDING AND PER CAPITA FUNDING EXPERIMENTS 
 In theory, both competitive bidding and equal funding per capita made 
good sense. Competitive bidding recognizes the reality that a single program 
operating in a service area may not be able to represent all the diverse, and 
sometimes conflicting, groups of poor people residing there, and that different 
approaches may be needed to meet diverse needs.  Equal funding per capita, in 
turn, insures that the funding of services will be equal from area to area, both 
in an inter- and intra- program sense. 
Let a thousand flowers bloom, Congress seemed to be saying, but let each 
get equal amounts of water and fertilizer! 
Upon until now we have been considering the situations where Congress 
tries to regulate legal services programs through the Legal Services 
Corporation.  Now we are going to consider two instances where, in 1995-
1996, the Congress adopted provisos which attempted to regulate the 
Corporation directly and, even more importantly, attempted to introduce new 
ways by which the Corporation – and legal services programs – should do 
business.  The first of these provisos was, that no later than April 1, 1996, the 
Corporation should “implement a system of competitive awards of grants and 
contracts to all basic field programs. . . .”  The second innovation was that 
funds for basic field programs should be allocated “so as to provide. . .an equal 
figure per individual in poverty for all geographic areas.” 
It is noteworthy that both of these new approaches to legal services were 
introduced at the instigation of middle-of-the-road Republicans and Democrats 
such as Congressman Jon Fox (R., Pennsylvania, 13th Dist.) and Congressman 
 
 40. CRLA’s policy of not representing the poor in court in domestic relations cases has 
already been discussed. Regarding CRLA’s handling of a major lawsuit which established the 
right of poor women to obtain California-funded abortions, see Committee to Defend 
Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 29 Cal.3d 252, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981). 
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Charles Stenholm (D., Texas, 17th Dist.), who had gotten tired of the old game 
of command-and-control regulation and decided to introduce some free 
marketing into the game (the competitive bid requirement) along with some 
old fashioned populism (per capita funding).  This was the same group of 
moderate Congresspersons who were able to restore $50 million to the final 
LSC appropriation for FY 1996 on condition that LSC implemented 
competitive bidding and per capita funding.  Much to the credit of 
Congressmen Fox, Stenholm, and other middle-of-the-roaders, the competitive 
bidding and per capita funding requirements were the most innovative 
interventions made in legal services since the program itself was established in 
1965.41 
On April 1, 1996, LSC published its proposed competitive bidding 
regulations in the Federal Register.42  On October 29, 1996, LSC announced 
the list of the various programs which it funded for 1997 and beyond.43  The 
scorecard: Previously-funded legal services programs, 288 out of 289; new 
proposals in competition with existing legal services program: 1. 
After the union representing the workers of the program that had been 
defunded brought pressure, that program was de-funded too, and the final score 
read: Incumbents 289, competitive-bid challengers, 0.44  Coincidentally 
enough, the one program which was initially de-funded by LSC in 1996 was 
located in the  district of the Congressperson who had proposed the 
competitive-bid requirement to begin with.45 
So much for competitive bidding. The initial competitive bidding 
regulation was issued on April l, 1996. 
If California Rural Legal Assistance was any indication, the equal 
allocation/client requirement fared no better.  Since at least 1995, for example, 
CRLA allocated $4.00/poor person to its Stockton office; $5.80 to its Modesto 
office; $6.50 to its Santa Rosa office; $13.20 to its Medera office $13.60 to its 
Delano office; and $14.0 to its Salinas office,46 not to mention that CRLA was 
spending a full third of its $6 million total budget on its San Francisco office, 
 
 41. To give credit where credit is due, the first program of per capita funding was introduced 
by Thomas Ehrlich, President of the Legal Services Corporation in the Carter Administration and 
former dean of the Stanford Law School.  After leaving LSC, Mr. Ehrlich became President of 
Indiana University, where his duties included supervising basketball coach Bob Knight. 
 42. 45 C.F.R. § 1634, published in 61 Fed. Reg. 14,252 (1996). 
 43. 61 Fed. Reg. 55,827 (1996). 
 44. Eleven new proposals were funded under the competitive bidding requirement, but all 
were spin-offs of previously LSC-funded programs. Interview with Ken Boehm, President, 
National Legal and Policy Center (May 1, 1997). 
 45. The Congressman was Jon Fox, R., Pennsylvania 13th District. Interview with Ken 
Boehm, President, National Legal and Policy Center (May 8, 1997). 
 46. The figures on how much CRLA spent on each of its offices in 1995 were prepared by 
CRLA’s Santa Rosa office.  David Harkavy & David Grabill, “Comments on Executive 
Director’s Restructure Plan,” Oct. 20, 1995. 
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where no rural poor or farm workers were located!  In 1995, this practice was 
decried by 15 of 16 of CRLA’s directing attorneys from its local offices. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, no survey has ever been done by the 
Legal Services Corporation as to whether the per capita funding requirement is 
being enforced by its some 400 programs, nor in the past three years has the 
Congress exercised any oversight as to whether the requirement has been 
enforced.  Clearly, if the Congress had wished to have its 1996 innovations 
implemented by LSC, it could have held oversight hearings in the House, 
which has the power of the purse, and withheld funding to LSC if LSC’s 
conduct was less than satisfactory.  If President Clinton let down legal services 
by putting up little, if any, fight against any of the Gingrich retrenchments of 
1996, Republicans forgot about implementing the market reforms of 1996. 
V. TRYING TO COMPENSATE FOR LEGAL SERVICES LOSES IN FEDERAL 
FUNDING THROUGH IOLTA FUNDING 
 In 1980, just before Ronald Reagan was sworn in as President, Congress 
authorized the creation of Negotiable Order of Withdrawal (NOW) accounts, 
which for the first time permitted federally insured banks to pay interest on 
demand deposits.47  NOW accounts were permitted, though, only for deposits 
that consisted solely of funds in which the entire beneficial interest was held by 
one or more individuals or by an organization that were operated primarily for 
charitable, e.g. not-for-profit purposes.  But so long as the NOW accounts were 
devoted only to non-profit purposes, attorneys were free to create such 
accounts from short-term deposits which their clients made with them.  What 
was valuable about such accounts funded by clients was the interest they 
generated, which although small per each individual client, could add up if the 
interest from all the clients’ accounts in a state were together by, say, a state 
bar association and, say, used to fund legal services programs.  During the 
early 1980’s, this was exactly what state bar associations did around the 
country, and by 1985, every state in the country except Indiana had such 
programs, which were called “Interest Only Lawyers Trust Account” 
programs, or “IOLTA” for short.48  By 1998, it is estimated, the IOLTA 
programs in the 49 states were returning to legal services programs some $100 
million/year, or 36% of the funding which legal services was receiving from 
the Congress in 1996.49  Another way of looking at the IOLTA phenomenon 
 
 47. Sec. 303, 94 Stat. 146, as amended, 12 U.S.C. 1832. 
 48. See discussion in Washington Legal Foundation v. Texas Equal Access to Justice 
Foundation, 94 F.3d 996, 1000 (5th Cir. 1996). 
 49. Total IOLTA revenues throughout the country have ranged from $100 million per 
annum to $130 million, depending on what the prevailing interest rate is.  In 1998, total revenues 
were estimated at $110.  Interview with Richard Samp, attorney for the Washington Legal 
Foundation, who headed up the litigation against Texas’ IOLTA program, April 13, 1999. 
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was that while Gingrich took $122 million away from the legal services 
program in 1996, IOLTA gave $100 million back, making up for 82% of what 
legal services had lost.  As the Bible saith at Job 1:21, “The Lord giveth and 
the Lord taketh away, blessed be the name of the Lord.” 
In addition to IOLTA money, legal services programs around the country raise 
an estimated $10-15/year million in other non-federal monies, primarily from 
charitable foundations.50  Since soon after its inception, IOLTA began arousing 
the ire among conservatives who wished to see little or no legal services 
program at all, first because IOLTA monies were being to supplement for cuts 
which conservative congresspersons were sometimes able to make in the 
program, and second and even more important, because the IOLTA monies 
were being used to fund litigation which Congress had prohibited legal 
services lawyers to do with federal monies.  Finally in 1995, a conservative 
public interest law firm, the Washington Legal Foundation, filed suit against 
Texas’ IOLTA program, and in 1996, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found 
for the Plaintiffs, holding that “any interest which accrues belongs to the owner 
of the principal,” rather than to the IOLTA program.51 
 In 1998, in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation, the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the Fifth Circuit, ruling that in authorizing the taking of interest 
earned by the principal deposited by clients with their lawyers, the Texas 
IOLTA program was violative of the Takings Clause of the 5th Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution.52  The rule that “interest follows principal” has been 
established under English common law since at least the mid- 1700’s, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist argued in writing for the majority.  This is the law of Texas 
as well.  The fact that IOLTA accounts are usually so small in amount for each 
individual client that they cannot reasonably be expected to generate any 
interest for the client is irrelevant, the Chief Justice said.  “We have never held 
that a physical item is not ‘property’ simple because it lacks a positive 
economic or market nature.  . . .While the interest income at issue here may 
have no economically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and 
disposition are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere to the property.”53 
 
 50. The CRLA Foundation, begun by California Rural Legal Assistance in 1980 shortly 
before Ronald Reagan was inaugurated, raises approximately $500,000/year in non-federal, non-
IOLTA.  Increasingly, the tendency among legal services programs is to raise all non-federal 
monies through separate-but-related non-profit, tax-exempt entities.  See Penelope Hammil, 
“Elder Rights Advocacy and the Legal Services Corporation Restrictions: How Serious is the 
Conflict?,” Clearinghouse Review (1997) 263-64. 
 51. See supra note 47. 
 52. 118 S. Ct. 1925 (1998).  The case was decided by a 5-4 majority, with Chief Justice 
Rehnquist writing the opinion for the majority and Justices Souter and Breyer writing dissenting 
opinions. 
 53. 118 S. Ct. at 1933. 
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 Another argument which could have been advanced in support of the 
majority’s opinion in Washington Legal Foundation but was not is that if 
clients of lawyers funding IOLTA accounts were given the opportunity to 
decide for themselves whether they wanted their monies supporting legal 
services programs, some of them might decide not; but under current IOLTA 
programs, clients are not permitted to exercise such rights, which in and of 
itself may be described as an unconstitutional “taking.”54 
 Given the closeness of the Court’s decision in Washington Legal 
Foundation, it is possible that with one or two more appointments to the Court 
by Democrat Presidents, the Court’s decision could be reversed and IOLTA 
programs will be resurrected in all 49 states much as before.  An even more 
likely scenario is that after some going back and forth, IOLTA programs will 
have to do with clients’ short-term deposits what labor unions were required to 
do with the portion of the members’ dues being expended on political 
activities, namely that the unions had to get some sort of OK from each 
member before such was done.  The Supreme Court decision which established 
the latter duty, on unions, was Abood v. Detroit Board of Education,55 and 
Abood was followed by Ellis v. Brotherhood of Ry., Airline and S.S. Clerks, 
Freight Handlers, Exp. and Station Employees,56 Chicago Teachers Union, 
Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson,57 and Communications Workers of 
America v. Beck,58 not to mention numerous federal courts of appeal and 
district court opinions.59  It may be that after Washington Legal Foundation, 
state bar associations undertaking IOLTA programs will need to require each 
attorney to give full written disclosure to his/her client about what IOLTA 
 
 54. This argument was devised by the author. 
 55. 431 U.S. 209, 97 S. Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977). 
 56. 466 U.S. 435, 104 S. Ct. 1883, 80 L.Ed.2d 428, (1984). 
 57. 475 U.S. 292, 106 S. Ct. 1066, 89 L.ER.2d 232, (1986). 
 58. 487 U.S. 735, 108 S. Ct. 2641, 101 L.Ed.2d 634, (1988). 
 59. Although Washington Legal Foundation and the Abood line of cases reach much the 
same conclusion, namely that the approval of lawyers’ clients and union members must give their 
approval before certain monies are used for certain purposes, Washington Legal Foundation and 
the Abood line of cases are based on different constitutional theories.  Washington Legal 
Foundation, for its part, is based on a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause theory.  See generally, 
Richard Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard U. Press, 1985).  Abood and its progeny, on the other hand, are based on a First 
Amendment/Compelled Speech theory, which was first enunciated in the 1943 case of West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178, 87 L.E. 1628.  “If 
there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation,” Mr. Justice Jackson stated for a 
majority of the Court in Barnette, “it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be 
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess 
by word or act their faith therein,” 319 U.S. at 642, 63 S.Ct. at 1187; and 43 years later, the same 
passage was quoted in Abood, (by Mr. Justice Stewart).  Conceivably, if Washington Legal 
Foundation had been brought under a Compelled Speech theory, the same result could have been 
reached. 
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monies would be used for and to obtain informed written consent from each 
client before interest on the client’s trust account could be to benefit, say, legal 
services – or it may be that something less than this will be held to suffice in 
various of the county’s eleven federal circuits; but whatever is decided, it 
seems certain that there will be further litigation and that much of it will be 
launched by conservative legal groups like the Washington Legal Foundation. 
 A lot can be stake when decisions are made as to how monies are deducted 
from members’ paychecks or dues.  In Washington state, for example, after a 
majority of the voters approved so-called paycheck protection which would 
require union members’ annual written permission before allowing payroll 
deductions for political contributions, only 6,921 teachers union members 
check off for political contributions as opposed to c. 48,000 who checked off 
before the initiative passed.60  A measure similar to the Washington initiative 
was put on the California ballot for the June, 1998, election;61 but it lost after 
state and national unions expended a reported $20 million in defeating it.  In 
the author’s opinion, the likely result of all this skirmishing will be that most 
clients will check off for IOLTA in one fashion or another because they have 
nothing to gain financially by not checking off. 
VI. WHY LEGAL SERVICES ATTORNEYS HAVE SO LONG HELD ON TO THE 
HOPE OF DOING IMPACT LITIGATION DESPITE CONGRESSIONAL 
DIRECTIVES TO THE CONTRARY 
 In 1998, the Legal Services Corporation reported, legal services programs 
around the country handled some 1.9 million cases.62  Now that legal services 
attorneys can do little more than service work, it is safe to assume than most of 
these cases involved service, rather than impact, work.  Assuming that legal 
services programs have handled a minimum of 1.5 million service cases for 
each of the past twenty years, from 1979 through 1998, legal services as a 
whole has handled c. 30 million cases during this time period. 
 One way of looking at the major structural changes that were made in legal 
services in 1996 were that they were the culmination of more than twenty years 
of restricting what legal services lawyers could do and cutting back on their 
funding.  Another way of viewing the 1996 changes was to put them in the 
context of still other structural changes which were made in 1996, to wit: 
impecunious mothers could no longer get AFDC for more than five years in 
each mother’s lifetime; as of the year 2000, most mothers on the rolls would be 
 
 60. Letter from Jami Lind, Evergreen Freedom Foundation, Olympia, WA, to author, 
February 10, 1998. 
 61. Marc Sandalow, Unions Fight California Proposition, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 
Feb. 18, 1998. 
 62. Federal Legal Service Acknowledge Overcounting Caseload, SAN FRANCISCO 
CHRONICLE, April 8, 1999, at A5. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
1998] ALMOST THE LAST WORD ON LEGAL SERVICES 317 
taken off and had to get jobs instead; immigrants illegally present in the 
country could no longer receive most kinds of public benefits; disabled persons 
under the age of 65 could no longer receive Supplemental Security Income 
(SSI) if they were found to be abusing alcohol and/or drugs.63 
 It might be a mistake to suppose that the reforms of 1996 were simply 
aberrations of a Radical Republican Congress, (the most radical, it might be 
argued, since the Radical Republican Congresses of the late 1860’s).  It point 
of fact, the 1996 legislations, arrived at by an Opportunity Society Republican 
(Mr. Gingrich) and a New Democrat (Mr. Clinton) may not only have 
anticipated what most Americans wish for the future – namely the acceptance 
of more personal responsibility, at least for the poor – but also acknowledged 
the frustration which had been building up among most Americans for some 
time about undeserving people getting something for nothing and complaining 
about how little they were getting besides.  It is realistic for even the most die-
hard of legal services attorneys to believe that with the House returning to 
Democrat control in due course, the 1996 reforms will somehow be reversed 
and the needy will be told that, yes, it’s once again OK for welfare mothers to 
implement a life strategy of not working, foreign nationals to cross the border 
illegally and receive a variety of public benefits, and SSI applicants to abuse 
drugs and/or alcohol as much as they like?  Of course not. 
 If, then, the 1996 reforms may be here to stay, at least for the foreseeable 
future, it may be reasonable to ask why so many legal services attorneys still 
seem to cling to the notion that at sometime in the future, they will be restored 
to the position of being able to do as impact litigation of their choice. 
 In order to understand why legal services lawyers have clung so long to the 
idea that they should and once again will be able to undertake big case 
litigation on behalf of the poor, one might return to the euphoria of the mid-
1960’’ when legal aid was being transformed into legal services and, indeed, 
an Access to Justice revolution was breaking out all over the country, begun by 
the U.S. Supreme Court, no less.  Let us recall, for example, the case which 
began it all, Griffin v. Illinois,64 where five members of the Court led by Mr. 
Justice Black held in 1956 that indigents convicted of a crime had a right to 
obtain a free copy of the transcript of their trial proceedings when appealing 
their convictions.  Then, seven years later, came Gideon v. Wainright,65 which 
held that indigents who were being criminally prosecuted had a right to free 
 
 63. The restriction in public benefits pertaining to AFDC and illegal immigrants are set forth 
in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-193, 110 Stat. 125 (1996), as codified in 8 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.  The drugs/alcohol 
prohibitions for SSI applicants and recipients are found in the Contract with America 
Advancement Act of 1996, P.S. 104-121, Sec. 105, 110 Stat. 852 (1996), as codified in 42 U.S.C. 
423. 
 64. 351 U.S. 12, 100 L.Ed. 891, 76 S. Ct. 585 (1956) (Black, J.). 
 65. 372 U.S. 335, 83 S. Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (Black, J.). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
318 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:2 
legal counsel, followed by Miranda v. Arizona,66 which held that a person who 
was in police custody had to be advised of his/her right to remain silent and to 
counsel before a confession could be taken from him which was admissible in 
court; In re Gault,67 which held that the right to counsel extends to juveniles 
accused of a crime; Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bay View,68 which 
held that before a worker’s wages could be garnished, he must receive notice 
and a judicial hearing; and Goldberg v. Kelly,69 which held that before welfare 
benefits could be cut off or denied to a recipient or applicant, an administrative 
fair hearing must be granted.  After Mr. Justice Brennan retired, he said that of 
all the opinions he wrote, the one he was proudest of was for the majority in 
Goldberg.  By the time the Court decided Edelman v. Jordan in 1974,70 the 
brakes were being put on what the Warren court had wrought and there would 
be few, if any, further sweeping judicial interventions would be made on 
behalf of the poor. 
 But during the seven years that the Access to Justice revolution was in full 
swing, it was euphoric indeed to behold what was going on and, to small 
degree, participate in it, especially for those like the author who had been 
accused of being members of the “silent generation” during the 1950’s and, as 
a result, were largely of no social consequence.  Years later, younger lawyers 
who followed in the footsteps of the first generation of equal access 
practitioners would speak with reverence of what seemed to them like a golden 
age, and in April, 1999, California’s leading legal newspaper, the Daily 
Journal, devoted a front page retrospective of CRLA circa. 1966-72.71  It is 
unlikely that the Daily Journal would have expended such effort if the CRLA-
of-then had been handling only service cases. 
CONCLUSION: A CONSENSUS HAS FINALLY BEEN REACHED 
 Everything now about legal services seems to be decided for the 
foreseeable future, namely that LSC-funded legal services programs are going 
to receive LSC funding so long as they stick to doing service work and non-
profit spin-offs from these programs can raise as much non-LSC money as 
they can to do the kinds of impact litigation which LSC-funded programs are 
prohibited from doing, just as the A.C.L.U., Environmental Defense Fund, and 
other public-interest law firms have been doing for some time. 
 
 66. 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) (Warren C.J.). 
 67. 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed. 527 (1967) (Fortas, J.). 
 68. 395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969) (Douglas, J.). 
 69. 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970) (Brennan, J.). 
 70. 415 U.S. 651, 94 S. Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.).  In what would 
soon become a time-honored tradition, the six-man majority of the newly constituted Berger 
Court would invoke the Eleventh Amendment to hold that although a federal court could issue 
injunctive relief against state officials, it could not impose damages on them. 
 71. DAILY JOURNAL, April 12, 1999. 
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 All that remains now is a gracious acknowledgment of the obvious, which 
will enable friends of the program to appear more grateful for the largesse they 
do receive from the Congress, which is not inconsiderable, and foes of the 
program to appear more humane.  And who knows, some legal services and 
their clients might even write thank you notes to their local congresspersons 
who vote appropriations for the program, “making nice,”72 as it were and the 
funding for legal services might climb upward, whether the Democrats or 
Republicans are in power—because almost every story, after all, can have a 
happy ending. 
 
 72. “Making nice” is a Jewish expression for, well, making nice. 
